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4.1  Introduction 
The  Reagan  administration is  sometimes thought  to  have  reversed  the 
growth of the welfare state by eliminating or shrinking welfare programs at all 
levels of  government and by removing new redistributional initiatives from 
the national agenda. This assault on the welfare state was motivated at least in 
part by philosophical considerations. Leaving aside questions of cost and ef- 
ficacy, the new administration aimed to confine welfare payments to the “de- 
serving poor” (the aged, children, the permanently disabled, and others who 
could not be expected to enter the work force) in order to reduce the distorting 
effects of welfare both in labor markets and on the moral character of recipi- 
ents. In practice, the administration sought to reduce payments to those with 
relatively high incomes by  tightening eligibility standards and by  reducing 
benefit levels on various programs (Palmer and Sawhill 1982). 
Looking back over developments in the 1980s, we can see that things were 
more complicated than this. First, in real terms, welfare expenditures contin- 
ued to grow throughout the 1980s.’ Part of this growth was due to the increase 
in Social Security outlays but part was due to growth in programs with more 
explicitly redistributional aims. Second, where cutbacks occurred, they were 
largely concentrated in  a transient political moment in  the first year of  the 
Administration’s tenure in  office.* Indeed, many  of  the sharpest cuts were 
really continuations of  retrenchments begun under the previous administra- 
tion. Thus, Reagan’s actual impact on welfare policy seems to have been con- 
centrated in time during his first administration and, more narrowly yet, in his 
first year in office. 
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I shall argue that both the timing and location of the programmatic changes 
that occurred in the 1980s can best be understood within an institutional polit- 
ical economy framework. Each welfare program has  its own characteristic 
political foundation-a  set of interests that are served by it-and  because of 
this,  some programs are more vulnerable to electorally induced changes in 
Congress or in the executive than are others. The fact that programs vary in 
their insulation from electoral tides implies that the composition of the welfare 
state will evolve in certain predictable ways as political conditions change: 
some programs will maintain stable funding levels and political support while 
others will flourish briefly but then die. This is not to deny the importance of 
shifts in presidential policy, economic performance, or ideology; rather, such 
influences are constrained by  the preexisting institutional structures of  the 
welfare system. 
The fact that programs with different political foundations are differentially 
successful over time implies that both program proponents and opponents will 
take account of this relationship in the political process of program building. 
Typically, the choice is between a program that is effective in meeting philo- 
sophical goals but vulnerable to shifts in political conditions, and a program 
that is politically unassailable but less effective in achieving its stated pur- 
poses. 
I develop my argument in the following way.  After a brief overview of de- 
velopments in the Reagan years and some methodological remarks, I present 
a simple model of the political economy of the welfare state that accounts for 
the peculiar pattern of  American income support programs until the 1970s. 
Second, I present an overview of the evolution of welfare spending over the 
past 40 years. Third, I trace a series of important political changes beginning 
in the middle 1960s that had the effect, over a 20-year period, of reducing (or 
at least altering) the fragmentation of congressional interests and institutions. 
Fourth, I show how the Reagan administration responded to this new set of 
congressional circumstances in devising its welfare plans. Fifth, I introduce a 
simple model of congressional decision making that allows us to ask about the 
effects of the increase in the centralization of congressional practices on wel- 
fare policy. Finally, I examine the implications of these changes on welfare 
policy and assess the impact of the Reagan “revolution” on the shape of Amer- 
ican welfare programs. 
4.2  The Reagan Revolution 
In the last two decades there has been a general tendency toward a retrench- 
ment in the welfare state throughout the world of advanced industrial democ- 
racies. Some commentators trace this to deteriorating economic performance, 
others to a maturation of  the welfare state, and still others to a conservative 
shift  in  popular  preferences.  Perhaps whatever  cutbacks occurred in  the 
1980s would best be understood as responses to these apparently international 
phenomena. Indeed, if reductions in the growth of welfare spending occurred 125  Changes in Welfare Policy 
in virtually all of the advanced democracies, and at the same time, there would 
seem to be  little need for an institutional explanation of the sort proposed 
here. 
For example, Klein and O’Higgins (1988) have analyzed changes in real 
growth rates for various welfare programs, before and after 1975, in 14 ad- 
vanced democracies. They found that changes in growth rates are responsive 
to changes in the growth rate of real GDP and (weakly) to a measure of the 
relative size of welfare programs in 1975. Thus, those countries with larger, 
and presumably more “mature,” welfare systems had relatively low growth 
rates, as did those whose gross domestic product (GDP) was growing slowly. 
But, there remained very considerable variability in  this relationship across 
programs  and  countries.  Generally  speaking,  they  found  that  the  larger 
Anglo-Saxon countries in their study (the United States, Britain, and Canada) 
exhibited lower post-1975 growth rates in welfare expenditures than were pre- 
dicted by  their model. Thus, while it seems likely that the changes in eco- 
nomic performance that occurred throughout the world precipitated program- 
matic reductions,  it seems unlikely  that they these changes alone account 
either for the magnitude or distribution of  changes observed in the United 
States. 
A sharp retrenchment in the “social safety net” would represent a watershed 
in recent American history, marking a break in the development of  welfare 
policies that began in the New Deal and Great Society and continued through- 
out the 1970s (Ginsberg and Shefter 1990). Reagan’s election in 1980 may, in 
this regard, have signaled a profound shift in the basic partisan and ideological 
sentiments  in  the  nation.  Such  a  “realignment”  would  have  undermined 
the “New Deal coalition” of urban and farm interests that has provided the 
political  basis  for  the  system  of  income  transfer  and  insurance schemes 
that  have composed the American welfare state. Indeed,  one of  the goals 
of  the new  administration was precisely to undercut this political basis so 
that  the  foundations for welfare policy would no longer be  a “social log- 
roll” but would be dictated instead by  fiscally and morally conservative prin- 
ciples. 
On the surface, this view seems fairly plausible. In his first year in office, 
Reagan did succeed in focusing the nation’s political agenda on three things: 
cutting tax rates, increasing defense capability, and reducing federal involve- 
ment in the economy. And in  1981, the new administration won a series of 
startling victories in Congress on all three of these fronts. Some analysts argue 
that, by undertaking these policies early in his term, Reagan was largely suc- 
cessful in undercutting the political basis of the Democratic party (Ginsberg 
and Shefter 1990). 
However, Reagan’s programmatic impact was not evenly distributed across 
welfare  programs.  While  he  left broadly  based  social insurance schemes 
alone, Reagan employed the “reconciliation process” to force the Democratic 
House-and,  specifically, its Democratic-led committees-to  accept substan- 
tial cuts in a variety of more narrowly targeted welfare pr~grarns.~  Many of 126  John A. Ferejohn 
these cuts were achieved either by eliminating whole programs or by reducing 
their benefits and eligibility levels. Means tested programs such as Aid for 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), veterans’ pensions, Medicaid, 
Social Security Insurance (SSI), and Food Stamps suffered some cuts in eli- 
gibility and benefit levels, but continued to grow (at reduced rates) throughout 
the Reagan years. In contrast, grants programs aimed more indirectly at the 
poor (Comprehensive Employment Training Act, or CETA, the Job Corps, 
Public Service Employment, Head Start,  and other educational programs), 
tended to fare much worse and in some cases were even eliminated. 
Thus, the Reagan administration’s most significant changes in welfare pro- 
grams occurred in 198  1, when authorizing legislation was rewritten under the 
pressure of  the reconciliation process of  the Budget Act, and were not fol- 
lowed by  very substantial changes afterward. In fact, for most of  the rest of 
Reagan’s period in office, the trend in the welfare system was to increase fund- 
ing levels in real terms. Moreover, many of the changes in the composition of 
the welfare system actually trace back to the last two years of the Carter ad- 
ministration. For example, the collapse of funding for Public Service Employ- 
ment began in 1979, following a 75% increase in program outlays between 
1975 and 1978 (Burtless 1986). Reagan made deeper cuts in these programs 
than had Carter but his policies should not be seen as a radical departure from 
those of the Carter administration in this area. 
Reagan’s welfare initiatives were not confined to his legislative agenda. On 
the administrative side, his appointees are supposed to have launched a sys- 
tematic effort to tighten up eligibility claims for a variety of programs, includ- 
ing Social Security Disability Insurance and veterans’ programs. Bureaucrats 
were urged to change long-standing practices governing what kind of  evi- 
dence would be used to determine program eligibility, and administrative law 
judges were urged to sustain these new  interpretations and practices even in 
the face of hostile court  ruling^.^ 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Reagan’s judicial appointees may 
yet form the basis for his most effective challenge to the American welfare 
system. Newly appointed judges could choose to establish a conservative ad- 
ministrative law regime in which claimants’ rights to welfare benefits would 
be  defined more narrowly than has been the tendency in the past quarter- 
century. These efforts, if  they succeed, might have profound effects on the 
political foundations of the welfare system. 
4.3  Assessing Policy Change 
Before beginning the analysis it is necessary to make some remarks about 
the nature of  the comparisons I wish to make in this paper. I wish to assess 
“what happened in the 1980s:’  and what was the effect of the Reagan admin- 
istration’s actions on welfare policy. But to address either of these questions 
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had the 1970s magically continued, or had Jimmy Carter won the 1980 presi- 
dential election, or had the Republicans not gained control of the Senate in the 
elections of that year. 
Typically, the specification of  such a model is  buried in the baseline for 
comparative statements, and this paper will not be exceptional in this regard. 
We  may think of several different quantitative measures for evaluating pro- 
grammatic change: change in  nominal spending, change in  real  spending, 
change in real per capita spending, and change in the program’s share of GNP. 
Indeed, for other purposes, still other measures might be more enlightening: 
for example, at the NBER conference for which this discussion was originally 
prepared, Larry Summers suggested the use of “new programs” initiated over 
time. In each case, the null or baseline hypothesis is that measured change is 
constant over time. 
The use of any one of these measures implies acceptance of a specific polit- 
ical theory of welfare policy. For example, if  we examine change in welfare 
as a proportion of GNP, we are assuming that “somehow” political institutions 
will tend automatically to keep this ratio constant over time. If, on the other 
hand, we examine changes in real aggregate expenditures we are assuming 
that “somehow” political institutions will respond automatically to shifts in 
real demand-and-supply conditions. The important points to make are these: 
first, evaluations vary depending on the measure employed; and, second there 
is no general theoretical justification-political  or economic-for  adopting 
any particular one of these (or alternative measures).6  Either of these compar- 
isons embodies a particular theory of  the political process and needs further 
justification on that account. 
For the present analysis, therefore, it seems wise to be somewhat eclectic 
in making comparisons and tentative in drawing conclusions. I will therefore 
present evaluations both in terms of  changes in real spending levels and in 
terms of changes in the proportion of GNP that is represented by welfare ex- 
penditures. Where data are available I will also occasionally employ other 
measures if their use seems enlightening. The point remains, however, that it 
is not possible to construct a completely satisfactory null model for purposes 
of comparative policy evaluation. 
4.4  The Congressional Foundations of the Welfare State 
A welfare program, like any publicly enacted policy, rests on a base of 
political support. Because American political institutions are so fragmented 
and its political parties are so heterogeneous and undisciplined, program pro- 
ponents cannot rely on partisan principles or shared ideological commitments 
to enact, fund, and implement their policies in the American federal system. 
Instead, program  advocates must  find  ways  to  build  and  retain  program- 
specific majorities, in both congressional chambers, that are willing to pro- 
vide support on occasions that votes must to be taken. This need for majority 128  John A. Ferejohn 
support and the fact that congressmen are separately elected in geographically 
defined constituencies places significant restrictions on the politics of welfare 
policy formation. 
Political support for welfare programs rests on one of  two broad bases: 
ideological or distributional. Either a majority of congressmen in each cham- 
ber must believe of a program that it is the “good” or “right” thing to do, or 
else a majority must believe that enough of their constituents stand to benefit 
from the program to induce their support. Obviously, no sharp line can be 
drawn between  these two  sorts of  political foundations since ideology  or 
views of good public policy are undoubtedly related to constituency charac- 
teristics as well as to the political beliefs of political actors (Dougan and Mun- 
ger  1989). There is little mystery in the fact that congressmen from urban 
areas are generally more liberal and are more likely to support expansive wel- 
fare legislation than are those from rural districts. Nevertheless, as is well 
known, the relationship between constituency and ideology is complex, and 
it is clear that virtually identical districts can and do elect and reelect very 
different sorts of  congressmen. Thus, if  only at the practical level, it seems 
sensible to make a distinction between ideological and distributional bases of 
support. 
Once this  distinction is accepted,  several important implications follow. 
First,  distributional differences among  policies or programs are inherently 
multidimensional. Thus, from the basic “chaos” theorems of political science 
we know that programs founded on the distribution of  program benefits are 
vulnerable to majority-rule instability: for every such program there is another 
potential or amended program that would be preferred to it by a majority in 
both chambers (McKelvey 1976). Second, and pointing in the opposite direc- 
tion,  we  note that  while distributional features tend  to remain stable over 
time-farm  districts tend to  remain farm districts and to retain certain basic 
interests in federal legislation for long periods of time-the  ideological com- 
position of Congress may fluctuate significantly over relatively short time pe- 
riods. Moreover, if the composition of Congress is sensitive to electoral tides, 
the partisan identity of  the president is even more so. Thus, programs based 
on ideological support coalitions are vulnerable to electorally induced shifts 
in the composition of Congress and in the executive. 
Program managers or supporters, therefore, face a characteristic dilemma: 
if political support for a welfare program is to be built on ideological founda- 
tions-on  the  acceptance  of  liberal  principles  in  favor  of  redistributing 
wealth-its  political foundation will be vulnerable to electoral, demographic, 
or psychological forces that may alter rapidly or slowly the distribution of 
opinion in Congress. If, however, the program is to be built on a distributional 
basis instead, a way  must be found to overcome characteristic majoritarian 
instability. I argue that three characteristic political responses to this dilemma 
may be found in the American welfare system. 
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vulnerable to shifts in  public sentiment and to election outcomes. Among 
these programs are those that provide public service employment to the poor, 
job skills development, and targeted educational programs. These programs 
challenge both the conservative preference for a small public sector and  its 
skepticism as to the efficacy of bureaucratic intervention in labor markets. It 
is not surprising that, when the public mood shifts in a conservative direction 
or when more Republicans are elected to Congress, programs of this sort fall 
on hard times. 
If a program is to rest on distributional rather than ideological support, the 
structure of congressional institutions provides two basic ways in which ma- 
joritarian instability may be overcome.8  Congressional action on welfare pro- 
grams, as on other programs, mostly takes place in committees and subcom- 
mittees and therefore reflects the preferences and opportunities of committee 
members. Moreover, in the case of welfare policy, the set of committees with 
jurisdictions in the area has been endogenously determined, including the la- 
bor,  agriculture, and finance committees of both chambers. This fact, along 
with the tendency for committee membership to be partly self-determined, 
imposes certain restraints on coalition formation, but it offers special oppor- 
tunities as well. Committees, because of  their overall jurisdiction and com- 
position, are able to develop some coalitions and not others. 
For example, the fact that the agriculture committees have jurisdiction over 
the commodity programs as well as the Food Stamps program, combined with 
the  fact that most committee members are more  interested in  maintaining 
commodity price supports than in maintaining Food Stamps, permits the for- 
mation of  an  alliance in  which  the  agriculture committees produce Food 
Stamps legislation in exchange for northern Democratic support for commod- 
ity programs on the chamber floors (Ferejohn 1986). Indeed, there is good 
reason to believe that this is why the agriculture committees claimed jurisdic- 
tion in this area and why  they generally oppose proposals to remove Food 
Stamps from their jurisdiction. 
Moreover, committees, partly because of the nature of their policy jurisdic- 
tions, tend to develop characteristic decision-making  styles or cultures (Fenno 
1973). Some committees make their decisions in  a relatively nonpartisan, 
nonideological fashion, while others are more contentious. To  some extent, 
these different styles seem to be reflected in the way that the parent chambers 
react to legislative proposals. The more ideological and contentious commit- 
tees tend to provoke more floor amendments and opposition than do the less 
fractious ones. In fact, in some cases, the chambers adopt procedures to limit 
the extent to which committee proposals can be subjected to floor amendment. 
Generally, if  a committee expects to receive such a procedural privilege, it 
must somehow assure the chamber that its proposal is not too controversial 
and that most legitimate points of view have been taken into account during 
committee consideration. 
One way to reduce the divisiveness of a policy proposal is to ensure that its 130  John A. Ferejohn 
benefits are very widely distributed. Thus, the finance committees, because 
they must generally formulate (multidimensional) tax and trade policies that 
could be severely changed in open floor consideration, characteristically look 
for ways to limit contentiousness in order to elicit chamber deference in the 
form of rules limiting amendments during chamber consideration. Indeed, the 
fact that they must formulate tax policy and that it is commonly accepted that 
tax policy ought not to be substantially changed on the floor, is one reason 
that their chambers try to ensure that these committees are fairly representa- 
tive of their parent chambers. The fact that the finance committees have a 
consensual decision-making “culture” and are broadly representative of their 
chambers is, I suggest, one reason that these committees have tended to pro- 
duce such programs as Social Security and Medicare, which deliver program 
benefits very widely, and why there is such resistance in those committees to 
policy  changes that would  sharpen the redistributive aspects of  these pro- 
grams. 
This argument can be extended throughout the welfare policy d~main.~ 
Committees have competed over jurisdictions in this area over the years and 
the winners of these struggles have developed support coalitions for their pol- 
icies that reflect the preferences, opportunities, and interests of  their mem- 
bers. In brief then, programs that emerge out of the labor committees are often 
founded on an ideological base, those that emerge from the finance commit- 
tees tend to rest on broad distributions of  program benefits, while those that 
emerge from committees with diverse jurisdictions (agriculture, energy, and 
commerce) are often founded on an alliance of  program recipients and pro- 
ducer interests. 
Thus, individual programs tend to reflect the specific institutional charac- 
teristics of  the committees that created and monitored them and, typically, 
different committees are able and willing to develop very different support 
coalitions for these programs. In effect, these varied political arrangements 
have yielded three kinds of  programs: programs that are politically popular 
(even untouchable) but very  inefficient at transferring income to the “truly 
needy”; programs that are relatively efficient in this regard but which are po- 
litically vulnerable; and programs that are supported by an alliance of produc- 
ers and clients, which share benefits between these groups and transfer income 
to the poor at the cost of subsidizing relatively high income producers. 
4.5  Rends in Welfare Spending 
The patchwork of programs and coalitions described in the previous sec- 
tion, rather than the idealized New Deal alliance of  farmers and organized 
labor, represented the political foundation of the chaotic welfare system that 
existed in  1970s, and it was intrinsically connected with the extreme institu- 
tional fragmentation of American institutions. This system possessed a fair 
amount of  stability against external political forces-witness  the congres- 131  Changes in Welfare Policy 
sional response to Nixon’s and Carter’s attempts at welfare reform-but,  at 
the same time, some programs were politically weaker than others and much 
more likely than others to expand or shrink (or even to disappear) in response 
to shifts in public opinion or election returns. 
In order to assess changes in the 1980s, it is useful to give an overview of 
how the various components of the welfare system have evolved over a longer 
time period. As is well known, the major social insurance programs-Social 
Security and  Medicare-that  distribute their benefits  widely  have  grown 
steadily throughout  the postwar  period,  both  as a  result of  demographic 
change and, more important, as a result of increasingly liberal benefits and a 
broadening of the proportion of the population eligible to receive benefits. For 
example, Social Security outlays as a proportion of GNP increased from less 
than 1%  at the beginning of the Eisenhower administration to over 5% at the 
end of  Carter’s term in office. Until the early 1970s, much of the growth in 
outlays for OASDI was traceable to explicit congressional  decisions  to expand 
program benefits; since then benefit levels have been indexed and increases 
became more automatic. 
Means-tested programs have grown too-though  more fitfully and less dra- 
matically. At the start of Eisenhower’s first term, outlays for these transfer 
programs stood at less than half of  1 percent of GNP, and this ratio stayed 
fairly constant for the following eight years. Under Kennedy, Johnson, and 
Nixon, outlays as a share of GNP for means-tested programs nearly quad- 
rupled (to about 1.8%), leveling off for the Ford, Carter, and Reagan admin- 
istrations. In real dollars, of course, there has been a rather more steady in- 
crease throughout the whole period. 
This aggregate view of the targeted component of the welfare system is a 
bit misleading, however, as can be seen if we distinguish between cash trans- 
fer programs and in-kind transfer programs.’O Here we can observe sharp dif- 
ferences in funding patterns: outlays for cash transfer programs stood at just 
under  .4% of  GNP at the beginning of  the Eisenhower administration and 
remained at that level until Nixon took office in  1969. Under Nixon, cash 
transfers grew to over .6% of GNP, and then began a decline under Ford and 
Carter, approaching the levels in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Outlays for the in-kind programs were quite different: these programs con- 
stituted a negligible component of social welfare until the 1960s, representing 
less than 10 percent of outlays. They increased explosively, however, under 
the Johnson and Nixon administrations, when they grew to nearly double the 
size of the cash transfer programs. Moreover, while outlays for cash transfer 
programs have grown slowly in real dollars and declined as a percentage of 
GNP over the past two decades, outlays for in-kind transfers have continued 
to grow over the same period, and they now are about triple the size of the 
cash programs. 
Thus, there has been a long-term tendency to provide more and more tar- 
geted welfare in in-kind transfers than in cash. There are a variety of possible 132  John A. Ferejohn 
explanations for this trend. First, there may have been an increase in paternal- 
istic reactions to the welfare problem. The public and its representatives may 
have become more distrustful of  those receiving means-tested benefits and 
chose,  therefore,  to  provide  welfare benefits  in  socially approved  forms. 
However, it is a little hard to believe that there could have been a significant 
attitudinal shift of  this sort in the past quarter-century. A second possibility 
points to the differences in the structure of  cash versus in-kind transfer pro- 
grams. One of the major cash transfer programs-AFDC-has  a significant 
state contribution, and it seems likely that competitive forces among the states 
would exert a downward pressure on funding (Peterson and Rom 1989). The 
in-kind programs are fully federally funded and subject to no such competitive 
restraint. Moreover, as federal funding for the in-kind programs grew, there 
was less pressure on the states to increase cash payments since in-kind trans- 
fers are partial substitutes for cash. Third, as I argued above, the growth in in- 
kind transfer programs might represent the formation of  legislatively crafted 
alliances between producers and welfare clients. 
Significantly, the dramatic increase in in-kind funding is narrowly concen- 
trated in time and took place in the very specific political circumstances of the 
late  1960s, a period  in which the Democrats had very large congressional 
majorities and also held the presidency.lL  I suggest that these circumstances, 
in which a heterogeneous majority party employs public programs to sustain 
its  diverse constituencies,  are  particularly  conducive to  the  formation of 
producer-client alliances.  It is perhaps not  surprising, in  this respect, that 
Nixon responded to the new configuration of the welfare system first by pro- 
posing to consolidate the welfare system in his proposed Family Assistance 
Plan-a  proposal that would have undermined the system of in-kind alliances 
that developed in the 1960s-and  subsequently by increasing the size of cash 
transfers and increasing the proportion of these transfers funded by the federal 
government. 
These trends can also be seen in governmental support for targeted efforts 
to increase vocational training and education. Again, there was  a dramatic 
increase in the Great Society period that continued through the Nixon, Ford 
and Carter administrations. For example, Gary Burtless (1986) estimates that, 
in terms of the percentage of GNP, these programs grew from about .  1  % to 
.8% from 1965 to 1980. As already mentioned, these programs stopped grow- 
ing during the last part of the Carter administration and declined sharply dur- 
ing Reagan’s period in office. 
Finally, we can see additional evidence of the changing composition of the 
welfare system,  and  of  the decline in  welfare state expansion during  the 
1970s, if we examine data on the initiation of new welfare programs. Robert 
Browning (1986, p. 82, table 5.6) has employed the voluminous Catalog of 
Federal Domestic Assistance to determine when each of  177 welfare programs 
was initiated during the postwar period. While this measure is very rough and 
takes no account of the size or impact of these programs, the pattern of  his 133  Changes in Welfare  Policy 
findings fits well with the data on outlays reported above. Browning counts 
13 programs initiated under Eisenhower, 16 during the Kennedy administra- 
tion, 77 new  programs during Johnson’s tenure, 23 during the first Nixon 
administration (1  8 of  which were congressionally initiated), 21 during the 
Nixon-Ford period (15 came from Congress), and just 13 during Carter’s pres- 
idency.” Browning’s data end after the first two years of the Reagan adminis- 
tration, but he found that only three new programs were started in this period, 
a rate of program initiation similar to that of the Eisenhower administration. 
Needless to say, nearly all of this program initiation is in in-kind programs or 
programs aimed at vocational training and education, and the bulk of  it oc- 
curred during periods of Democratic ascendancy. 
By  1980, then, the composition of the welfare system had evolved to in- 
clude a growing social insurance component, stagnant funding for means- 
tested cash transfer programs, expanding outlays for means-tested in-kind 
programs (though the development of new programs was declining), and de- 
clining support for programs aimed at job training and education. All this was 
well established before Reagan took office, and it was this pattern of programs 
and funding that confronted him early in his first term. 
4.6  The Changing Political Context 
While this description of the political foundations of welfare policy seems 
to account for the pattern of programs and program expenditures  until the late 
1970s, a number of important political changes started to occur in the 1960s 
that have started to have profound effects on welfare politics. These changes 
stemmed from several sources: (1) court involvement in districting practices, 
which have vastly reduced the degree to which rural areas are overrepresented 
in Congress; (2) the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which has, in the past quarter- 
century, fundamentally changed the nature of Southern politics by  producing 
a steady growth in two-party politics leading to the virtual disappearance of 
the Southern Democratic conservatives;  (3) the reforms in the committee sys- 
tem in the House, which led to substantially less autonomy for committees 
which are now  more dependent on the party caucuses and party leadership 
institutions to help enact legislation; (4) the growth in floor participation in 
both chambers, which resulted in a variety of leadership  responses (alterations 
in rules and practices) aimed at coordinating amending activity so that legis- 
lation previously written in committee could not be subjected to genuine con- 
sideration on the floor; (5) the growth in the utilization of omnibus legislative 
vehicles (such as reconciliation), which was stimulated partly by  presidents 
but which may also be seen as a response to the increase in floor activity. 
This is not the occasion to give a detailed argument as to how these changes 
were causally interrelated. Rather, I shall simply sketch how changes in elec- 
toral arena had subsequent and far-reaching ramifications in institutional prac- 
tices. By limiting the rural bias in the House of Representatives and enfran- 134  John A. Ferejohn 
chising Southern blacks, the demographic diversity of both House and Senate 
electorates was reduced. This had two effects, First, Republicans began win- 
ning Southern House and Senate seats so that Southern Democrats became a 
much smaller fraction of the Democratic Party than in the early postwar pe- 
riod. Southerners formed a majority of  the Democratic House delegation in 
the 80th Congress but they generally represented only about 30 percent of the 
delegation in the 1980s. Second, surviving Southern Democrats became more 
liberal since they had to compete in larger and more diverse electorates. At 
the same time, the newly Republican Southern seats were now represented by 
conservatives who were similar in most respects to Republicans from other 
regions of the country. 
In effect, then, both the congressional parties became relatively more ideo- 
logically homogenous and, because the range of intraparty disagreement was 
reduced, Congressmen of both parties became more willing to place authority 
in the party caucus and the leadership rather than in the committees. They 
became more willing to question or even reject committee recommendations 
on the floor. At the same time, new members representing demographically 
mixed districts became impatient to gain policy-making authority, which in- 
duced the parties to devolve decision-making power to subcommittees rather 
than to the committees. In turn, as policy formulation moved to smaller and 
less representative subcommittee venues, there was still less reason for the 
parent chambers to defer to committee recommendations and more reason to 
engage in floor-centered or “collegial” methods of decision. Thus, there was 
a rapid growth in amending activity, and committee legislation was increas- 
ingly subjected to extensive revision on the chamber floors. 
According to Steven Smith (1989), following the initial wave of committee 
reforms and the influx of  new members, “the number of  floor amendments 
skyrocketed when members looked to the floor as a new  outlet for expres- 
sion. , . . House decision making became far less predictable as nearly all 
members had more opportunities to offer floor amendments with some hope 
of success.” The picture Smith paints is one in which legislation was routinely 
ambushed on the chamber floors and in which neither the parties nor the com- 
mittee leaders were able to predict what kind of  legislation would emerge 
from the legislative process. Incentives for diligent committee work were re- 
duced and legislative proposals probably declined in quality which, in turn, 
reinforced the high level of amending activity. 
By  the late 1970s, this situation had become more and more intolerable to 
many Congressmen, and especially to committee and party leaders. There was 
a growing sense that new  mechanisms for regulating chamber consideration 
were necessary if  Congress was to produce good legislation and members 
were to play a role on the floor. The available mechanisms involved the use of 
omnibus legislative packages together with more elaborate special rules for 
structuring (and limiting) debate and amendments. 
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mainly on budgetary issues (omnibus appropriations  bills, budget resolutions, 
and reconciliation acts) that were considered under special restrictive rules in 
the House and informal agreements limiting amendments in the Senate. These 
omnibus bills transcended committee lines and permitted, indeed forced, at- 
tention to cross-jurisdictional  trade-offs that had been almost impossible in the 
pre-reform Congress. Some of this evolution was intended (for example, var- 
ious provisions of the Budget Act were devised to permit somewhat more 
synoptic modes of decision making) but some evolved out of the necessity of 
conducting congressional business in an orderly fashion in the relatively harsh 
economic conditions of the late 1970s. 
4.7  The Early Reagan Years 
In 1981, soon after taking office, Reagan and his advisers began to recog- 
nize that they had to effect enormous cuts in spending if  they were to have a 
chance to reduce the role of the federal government in the economy. But they 
also saw that  Congressmen, even Republican Congressmen, had  powerful 
electoral incentives to preserve their pet programs. Thus, OMB Director Da- 
vid Stockman feared that any budget-cutting package sent to Congress would 
simply unravel during legislative consideration. He recognized the need for 
some device by which Congress could be made to vote yes or no on the whole 
package of budgetary reductions.I3 
Early in the spring of  198 1, Reagan’s congressional strategists concluded 
that one of these new omnibus vehicles-the  reconciliation instructions in the 
budget process-could  be used to force Congress to accept broad expenditure 
reductions. The previous Congress had instructed its legislative committees  to 
reconcile their authorizations with the numbers in the first budget resolution, 
and it had enforced this reconciliation by adopting a highly restrictive rule for 
its consideration. The precedent having been handed to them, Reagan and 
Stockman together with Phil Gramm in the Democratic House decided to em- 
ploy the same procedure in 198  1. 
The critical votes in 1981 were on the rules governing consideration of the 
first budget resolution and the reconciliation package. In both cases, an alli- 
ance of  Republicans and  conservative Democrats in  the  House mustered 
enough votes to force a single “up-or-down” vote on the administration’s pro- 
posals rather than the ones that emerged from the Democratic committees. 
Thus, the president was able to get a straight vote on whether or not Congress 
would accept his proposed cuts in welfare programs and, in both cases, Con- 
gress agreed. 
Observers at the time either hailed or condemned these events as harbingers 
of a new era in which congressional  procedures permit a president to force his 
agenda on a complaisant Congress. Given the massive rejection that the Dem- 
ocrats had suffered in the congressional as well as presidential elections, it 
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president could effect profound changes in public policy even without partisan 
control of Congress. 
But what actually happened? First, the 1981 cuts in welfare programs were 
extremely uneven: Social Security was taken off the table even before the pro- 
posals reached Congress; the means-tested programs suffered some reductions 
in eligibility levels, while the targeted jobs and education programs were hit 
hard. Moreover, it appears in hindsight that 1981 was an exception: this pat- 
tern was not be repeated during the rest of Reagan’s tenure in office. 
The cuts in the welfare system instituted at that time seem less revolution- 
ary  now  than  they  did then.  The  largest programs-the  social insurance 
schemes-were  not only unscathed but, following the Social Security reforms 
of  1983, were put “off limits” for the rest of  the decade (and, no doubt, be- 
yond). The other insurance schemes fluctuated in response to short-run eco- 
nomic forces but did not fundamentally change direction during the Reagan 
years. Among the means-tested programs, those based on in-kind transfers 
were subjected to some reductions in  1981, but they quickly resumed a rapid 
rate of growth in real dollars throughout the 1980s.I4  Outlays for in-kind pro- 
grams dropped from 1.4% to 1.3% of  GNP in  1981 and  then grew slowly 
back to 1.4% by the end of the Reagan administration. 
Means-tested cash transfer programs were hit somewhat harder, but reduc- 
tion had really begun in the mid-1970s. The large cuts occurred in the rela- 
tively small jobs and educational training programs which were targeted at the 
poor. In any case, both the means-tested cash programs and the grants pro- 
grams were falling on hard times during the final years of  the Carter adminis- 
tration, and it is not clear that Reagan’s election had much to do with these 
declines. Reagan may have administered the coup de grace to these programs, 
but it now seems more an act of mercy than a fundamental restructuring of the 
welfare system. 
4.8  A Simple Model of Budgetary Decision Making 
What separates Reagan’s first year in office from his later ones? Republi- 
cans maintained control of the Senate until  1986 and, while the Democrats 
picked up  26 House seats in  1982, their presidential candidate lost disas- 
trously in 1984, leaving the party thoroughly demoralized. Nevertheless, even 
facing weak and divided opposition, why was Reagan unable to have much of 
an effect on the shape of the welfare system? The answer I propose here is one 
that is rooted in two claims. The first, which I take to be relatively uncontro- 
versial, is  that  the distribution of  congressional programmatic preferences 
shifted after the 1982 election in a decidedly more liberal direction. The sec- 
ond is, admittedly, more speculative: I argue that the use of omnibus legisla- 
tive  vehicles  such  as  the  reconciliation  process  actually  worked,  in  the 
post-1982 context, to produce larger budgets than would otherwise have been 
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I argued earlier that we  can understand the configuration of  welfare pro- 
grams as one that emerged from a relatively decentralized committee-based 
decision process. The emergence of new,  centralized legislative procedures 
seemed to threaten this equilibrium by permitting a conservative president to 
make “take it or leave it” offers to Congress, thereby allowing a substantial 
reduction in welfare expenditures. But is it true that the centralized procedures 
will produce smaller budgets than the older piecemeal methods of  funding 
programs? 
To  make the argument in the simplest possible setting, consider a unicam- 
eral legislature with 99 members that is deciding on funding two programs: a 
military program and a welfare program. There are two procedures they can 
employ: in the appropriations  procedure, the chamber decides on military ex- 
penditures first (by majority rule) and then on welfare spending. The budget, 
then, is the total of the two spending bills, and the rest is left to the private 
sector. In the budget process, the chamber decides on the overall spending 
level, and then, on the allocation of this spending between military and wel- 
fare spending. We  assume that each member has an ideal allocation in the 
space of  allocations and that each member has circular indifference curves. 
Finally, we assume that information about member preferences and proce- 
dures is commonly known and that members rationally anticipate the outcome 
of later votes when casting earlier ones.15 
In this setting, we can apply “backward induction” to solve for equilibrium 
budget levels under each of the two procedures and establish that the equilib- 
ria are unique and do not depend on the order of voting on programs. And, in 
fact, it is easy to give examples in which the budget is larger under the budget 
process than it would be under an appropriations process and vice versa. In- 
deed, one can give conditions on the distribution of preferences that are nec- 
essary and sufficient for this to occur. Thus, whether or not centralized proce- 
dures produce smaller spending on programs depends on the distribution of 
preferences. 
Assume that conservatives  tend to favor smaller welfare and larger military 
budgets, while liberals tend to have opposing preferences. Then, the budget 
process equilibrium will produce a larger budget than will a piecemeal process 
if  and only if preferences for increasing the size of the favored program tend 
to exceed the preference for reducing the size of the disfavored program-that 
is, as long as conservatives tend to be willing to accept an increase in welfare 
spending in order to increase military spending by the same amount and lib- 
erals tend to make the same trade-off in order to obtain an increase in welfare 
spending. One would think that congressional  preferences would generally be 
expected to satisfy this condition except in conditions of unusual economic 
stringency. 
Given this relationship between the distribution of preferences in Congress 
and the outcomes under each of the processes, members will have an induced 
preference over the procedures themselves. Thus, we  should find members 138  John A. Ferejohn 
supporting the procedure that produces their most desired outcome. In earlier 
research, we  found that this model worked well in the  1980-83  period in 
explaining the decision to enforce the reconciliation process by  enacting a 
restrictive rule forcing a vote on the size of the budget. In the ensuing years, 
the legislative vehicle was usually an omnibus continuing resolution that con- 
tained a number of  appropriations bills together with legislative authoriza- 
tions, and the crucial decision was again on how restrictive a rule would be 
given. In every case, the (Democratic) House adopted restrictive rules, so that 
the House as a whole, and later the president, was faced with  a large and 
complex package of legislation that could not be pulled apart. In effect, the 
Democrats found that they could use (end-of-session) omnibus legislation and 
restrictive rules to confront the president with a take-it-or-leave-it choice on 
legislation that contained numerous elements he disliked. 
On this view,  Reagan succeeded in 1981 only because he had enough Re- 
publican and Southern Democratic (Boll Weevil) votes in that Congress to 
shape the budget package in the White House. The vote margins in that year 
were razor thin and were, therefore, vulnerable to slightest shift in political 
climate. The onset of the 1981-82  recession was doubtless sufficient to shake 
the conservative coalition apart in the following session, but, in any case, the 
outcome of the 1982 congressional elections shifted the control of the agenda 
to the Democratic leadership in the House. After 1982, omnibus vehicles have 
been used more often to force the president’s hand than to discipline a recal- 
citrant Congress. 
Of course, the use of this tactic forced the leadership to find ways to adjust 
complicated legislative proposals emerging from multiple committees before 
these proposals reached the floor. This negotiation took place in a number of 
different ways and sometimes involved multiple referrals or the use of special 
rules giving various committees the right to attach their amendment to the 
omnibus bill,  and sometimes involved less formal means. In any case, the 
whole process had become substantially more centralized and dependent on 
the members’ willingness to trust their party leaders than had been the old 
appropriations process. 
4.9  Discussion: The Evolution of Welfare Policy 
Most of  Reagan’s impact on welfare policy came early in his administra- 
tion, when he had enough votes in the House to gain control of  its agenda. 
This impact was unevenly distributed across welfare programs: social insur- 
ance schemes were generally unaffected, in-kind means-tested programs suf- 
fered only minor alterations, means-tested cash transfer programs were cut 
back a bit more severely, and grants for education and job training were dras- 
tically reduced. In effect, those programs that rested on ideological bases of 
support suffered, and others did not, or at least, not very much. In any case, 
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House and firm control of  the rules regulating debate and amendment, the 
Democratic leadership was generally able to insulate welfare programs from 
further presidential assault. This growth in insulation continued through Rea- 
gan’s second term. 
Thus, the long-term impact of the Reagan administration was to introduce 
a temporary lull in  the growth of  the welfare state and a relatively minor 
change in its composition. The one area of substantial change-education  and 
job training programs-was  small and already suffering under Carter. In the 
end, other political changes, those stimulated by  demographic and electoral 
shifts largely reflected in Congress, will turn out to affect the shape of welfare 
policy more profoundly and more permanently. 
The fact that the partisan institutions in Congress have come to play a more 
central role in the formation of  welfare policy does not  necessarily mean, 
however, that expenditures for welfare programs will respond sharply to elec- 
toral changes. The volatility of welfare spending really depends on the politi- 
cal foundations of the programs themselves. Even in the propitious political 
conditions that prevailed in 1981, the Reagan administration’s impact on pro- 
grams was very uneven. Programs with sound political bases-those  which 
distribute benefits very widely or are based on an alliance of producers and 
clients-seem  to be able to withstand ideological attacks fairly well. And, it 
hardly needs saying that there is no sign as yet of significant electorally gen- 
erated  swings in the composition of  the House of  Representatives, which 
would have to form the preconditions for programmatic volatility. 
Finally and more speculatively, it seems possible that changes in rules and 
practices that permit leadership-based policy formation will make possible a 
new  level of  program coordination and  systematization that may  lead the 
American welfare system to look a little more like European systems and less 
like the fragmented system produced by  the decentralized pre-reform Con- 
gress. Insofar as program planning and development comes to center more in 
the (increasingly homogeneous) partisan structures of Congress and less in its 
diverse committees, the political foundations for the welfare state seem likely 
to become more orderly and to produce the conditions for the development of 
a more coherent set of welfare programs. In turn, I suspect we will also see 
the development of a more orderly and predictable bureaucratic system for 
determining eligibility and delivering benefits and facilitating the growing le- 
gal recognition of  “new (governmentally created) property” and of  the due 
process rights they entail. While it is too soon to draw any very strong conclu- 
sions as to these possibilities, the enactment of major welfare reform in 1987 
and 1988, which combined the imposition of a more substantial set of regula- 
tory requirements on AFDC recipients and the states, with expanded benefits 
and eligibility, may signal the direction of means-tested policies. This more 
coherent policy system should be much less vulnerable to electoral tides than 
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Notes 
1.  In real dollars, Social Security outlays increased by about 15% between the first 
and last Reagan budgets. Means-tested welfare programs increased by just under 25% 
over the same period. In terms of share of GNP, both Social Security and means-tested 
transfer programs declined somewhat over the same period: Social Security dropped 
from 5.2% of GNP to about 4.8%, while means-tested programs went from just over 
1.9% of GNP to just under that figure. These figures are from the Special Supplement 
of the Budget of  the US.  Government, 1989. 
2.  The growth in Social Security outlays in Reagan’s first term was under 6%; this 
growth was about 9% in his second term. The growth in the major means-tested pro- 
grams was about 10% in his first term and 14% in the second one. 
3.  If we examine popular attitudes toward welfare programs, it is difficult to find 
evidence of a marked rightward drift. In almost every year between 1973 and  1986, 
the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) asked random samples of  American 
adults the following question: “We are faced with many problems in this country, none 
of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these prob- 
lems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too 
much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.” When welfare came 
up in this context the responses exhibited a pretty clear pattern: from 1973 to 1975 and 
from 1982 to the present, about 20% of the respondents reported that we are spending 
“too little” on welfare and about 45% of the respondents said that we are spending “too 
much.” From 1976 to 1980, about 13% of the respondents thought we were spending 
“too little” and nearly 60% reported that we were spending “too much” on welfare. 
Thus, if there was a conservative reaction against welfare spending it took place during 
the Ford and Carter  administrations  and was over by  the beginning of  the Reagan 
administration (Shapiro et al. 1987, 125). 
4.  To be sure, in 1983, Social Security benefits were reduced and taxes raised as a 
result of a bipartisan agreement aimed at putting the funding of the program on a more 
solid basis. This effort seems not to have been a result of administration pressure- 
though some of the changes were ones sought by the administration-but  a reaction to 
what appeared to be the growing public apprehension about the vulnerability of Social 
Security benefits. 
5.  Mashaw (1988) has demonstrated however, that most of the uproar over the re- 
trenchment of the SSI disability program was actually due to congressionally mandated 
changes that originated in the 1970s. 
6. The reasons for this can be illustrated by considering the hypothesis that welfare 
spending should remain a constant proportion of GNP. Even if society consisted of 
only single “representative” consumer, the acceptance of this hypothesis entails mak- 
ing a very strong assumption as to the form of  the consumer’s preference ordering. 
Even if  we were willing to accept this point and make this strong assumption, if there 
are many voters and political choice is more than one dimensional, the “chaos” theo- 
rems of political science imply that there is no reason to believe that there is any func- 
tional relationship between policy outcomes and voter preferences (McKelvey 1976). 
7.  To be sure, in the case of  Congress, there are some reasons to think that this 
fluctuation may have attenuated in the last 50 years or so (see Ferejohn and Calvert 
1984). 
8.  This does not, of course, imply that this is why these institutions were invented 
or have evolved. The claim is only that no matter how institutions came to take on their 
current form, they form a strategic environment in which congressmen can attempt to 
build stable policy coalitions. 
9. I have elaborated on this argument elsewhere (Ferejohn 1983). 141  Changes in Welfare Policy 
10.  The cash transfer  programs  discussed  here are  AFDC and SSI. The in-kind 
programs  discussed  here  are Food  Stamps and  nutrition programs,  Medicaid,  and 
housing subsidies. 
11.  For a much more complete analysis of these trends see Browning (1986). 
12.  Gary Orfield (1975) demonstrates that Nixon had lost a significant degree of 
control over the process of policy formation in his first term and that Democratic Con- 
gresses forced a number of  unwanted programs on his administration. It seems likely 
that this loss of control was exacerbated in his second term. 
13.  This account draws heavily on David A. Stockman (1986). 
14. In constant dollars, outlays for in-kind programs grew about 30% after 1981. 
15. This model is developed in more detail by John Ferejohn and Keith Krehbiel 
(1987). 
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